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Abstract
This paper first locates Levinas within the currents of
twentieth-century philosophical and theological thought and
presents his philosophical anthropological view. It also dis-
cusses the ethical and anthropological logic of Christian paci-
fism and connects this with Levinas’ personalist philosophy
as an approach for dealing with todays conflicts. The paper
concludes with a call to commitment in nonviolence.
Introduction
Emmanuel Levinas’s personalist philosophy or ethics of responsi-
bility provides significant support for the logic of Christian pacifism and
the pacemaking/peacebuilding approaches for dealing with today’s vio-
lent conflicts.
Contemporary violent conflicts are dominantly identity conflicts.
They are intrastate, and asymmetric in nature. Rooted in relationship, most
of them are protracted.  This nature of conflict, the paper argues, require
an inner-oriented nonviolent peacemaking/peacebuilding approach, which
is capable of addressing the dynamics of human relationships, motives
and frustrations that lead to conflict, and of working toward personal and
structural transformation and the restoration of justice and relationship.
This pacifist perspective of peacemaking/peacebuilding is based on Jesus'
normative humanity and anthropological purview, which understands hu-
man beings as fundamentally relational, moral, and capable of self-tran-
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scending acts. It is this anthropological construct of Levinas, which en-
dears him to Christian pacifists. The paper will first locate Levinas within
the twentieth-century philosophical and theological currents and then
present his philosophical anthropological view. Next, it will show the ethi-
cal and anthropological logic of Christian pacifism and follows with an
elucidation of the elements for responsible process of peacemaking/
peacebuilding in dealing with today’s conflicts as Levinas’s personalist
philosophy and the logic of Christian pacifism support. The paper will
conclude with a call for a commitment to nonviolence.
Locating Levinas in the Twentieth-Century Philosophical and
Theological Current
Theology and philosophy battled similar challenges in the twenti-
eth-century of proving their relevance; having something to say that is of
benefit to humanity which has legitimacy in the scientific age. The philo-
sophical approach to this crisis varied. The analytic philosophy, launched
by Bertrand Russell, arose and dominated the Anglo-Saxon world. Exis-
tentialism arose in Europe, adopted phenomenology’s approach and fo-
cused on practical issues, which finds in human inner life of anguish, the
seeds of self-evaluation.  Significantly, theology aligned with philosophy in
this effort, thus, bringing theologians under the rubric of one broad philo-
sophical mode (existentialism) with atheists.
However, the crisis between theology and philosophy in the twen-
tieth-century is no less critical. The whole existentialist philosophical move-
ment was carried out within the triumphant milieu of liberal individualism,
of which traditional Christianity's community structure is the gravest ques-
tion it places itself on trial. What is common - and central - to all the
philosophers is that the meaning of religion and religious faith is recast in
relation to the individual. Some of the philosophical views put religion
itself radically in question such that the faith or the denial of faith they
produced was disconcerting to those interested in popular religion.  How-
ever, although the philosophical theologians find themselves under the ru-
bric of existentialism, they wind up in different religious camps, with some
of them desperate to establish their religious roots.
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No religious group resisted the liberal individualism and the philo-
sophical current that supported it as the Roman Catholic Church, whose
philosophical theologians “dug in behind ancient barricades and called for
a neo-Thomism in which ‘being’ was the subject matter that was beyond
science and hence open for philosophy.”  Notably, for nearly two centu-
ries, the Catholic Church remained aloof to the important subject of hu-
man rights, primarily because of their formulation in context and philoso-
phy of liberal exaltation of the individual over community. A change only
came with Pope John XXIII encyclical, Pacem in Terris, which endorses
human rights as linked with human dignity. Arguably, however, the Catho-
lic Church’s resistance to liberal individualism was concerned, primarily,
with protecting the Church and its authority, institutionally and dogmati-
cally, in the world. This contention finds support in the fact that classical
theology offered no adequate and compelling treatment of biblical per-
sonalism or of integration of person and community than was lived and
transmitted in the Church. But the Church was more an institution than a
community, such that true emancipation of the individual could hardly be
affirmed.  However, Protestant theologians like Karl Barth and Reinhold
Niebuhr were no less strong critics of (Protestant) liberal individualism
and inordinate optimism of human possibilities with sophisticated reason
and modern scientific civilization.
Remarkably, it was the personalist philosophers from within the
broad existential philosophical current who provided a sound and bal-
anced anthropology that complements the Christian traditional anthropol-
ogy, provided the necessary corrective to the one-sided extravagant lib-
eral individual, and the context upon which contemporary ethics build.
Jewish scholars, among them Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, are
outstanding in the group. Buber presents an anthropology founded on
what he calls the “I-Thou” relationship, contending thereby that the human
being is constituted in the relation with the other and not with the material
world. His “I-Thou” relationship is one of stimulation and reciprocity, which
is opposed to Heidegger’s Desein as a creature of solitude, whose au-
thentic existence is secured to oneself alone rather than in community with
the other. For Buber, as Jos? Comblin puts it, “What the ‘I’ discovers in
the ‘thou’ and vice versa is not the subjectivity of the other, nor the pro-
jection of the subjectivity of the ‘I,’ but really the other, by virtue of a
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certain immediate communication.”  For Levinas, Buber and Heidegger
have elements that are true to the nature of the human person. Thus, they
are unavoidably his interactive partners. However, he comes onto the
scene with an originality that broadens the perspective of Buber while
integrating the element of Heidegger’s isolated being. What is Levinas’s
anthropology?
Levinas’s Personalist Philosophy or Ethics of Responsibility
Levinas makes morality his ‘first philosophy,’ the central thesis of
which is intersubjectivity and responsibility as the essence and realization
of the human person.  He draws from his Hebraic tradition, which sees the
whole of human life to lay in fidelity to relationship, with the covenant God
at the center, in developing this thesis. From this background Levinas
develops his ethics of responsibility as first philosophy against the West-
ern prioritizing of the self, which is the root of the violent totalizing struc-
tures in which the “I” seeks to annihilate the other. Levinas’s project is not
to destroy the subject, but to develop an ethical suspension of the ideal
prioritizing or sovereignty of the self by a radical prioritizing of the other.
Thus, his first step is to establish that the human person is radically rela-
tional and realizes oneself only in responsible relationship.
To be sure, to say that Levinas grounds his thought in his Hebrew
religious tradition does not mean that his philosophy cannot stand apart
from this tradition. According to him, he never introduces a Talmudic or
biblical verse into his philosophical texts to try to prove or justify a phe-
nomenological argument except to illustrate.9  Levinas’s anthropology pre-
sents a balanced view of the human person in a phenomenology of social-
ity and ethical responsibility, a disclosure of personality that transcends
both the individual and the collective without underestimating the “isolated
subjectivism” (the problem with Buber), or locating sociality in the subject
alone (the problem with Heidegger).10  This philosophical anthropological
stance opposes any ontology seen as analogia entis, but tries to establish
a transcendence that cuts diachronically through “the unity of being and
the univocity of its esse.”11  For Levinas, the I-thou relationship is not one
of a synthesis of beings. The relationship with the Other (Autrui), accord-
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ing to him, is through an absence of the other (Autre), for which the I-thou
dialogue concentrates on the rupture of the individual from the whole,
thus, making the dialogue or relationship not one of symmetry as it is to
assure the I of its independence. It is from this asymmetrical structure that
Levinas develops the concept of the ego as the accusative “me” - the sub-
jectum - rather than the normative “I”.12
For Levinas, “subjectivity is not a modality of essence.”13  The
subject is constituted by responsibility to the other, a responsibility that
precedes human freedom, that is, dates before my beginning, dates in an
immemorial and unrepresentable past. What this means in Levinas’s con-
struct is that ethics or responsibility is the condition of being, yet, a site
outside ontology, anarchic to the totalizing of ontological categories. It is
an anarchic responsibility to my neighbor to which nothing in the rigorous
ontological order binds me, but which summons me from nowhere. This
dateless responsibility lies beyond all significations. Levinas locates the
condition for its appearance and signification in the rupture of proximity.14
Evidently, the anarchy of proximity brings to a halt the ontological play, for
consciousness begins only with relation to my neighbor to whom “I am
obliged without this obligation having begun in me, as though an order
slipped into my consciousness like a thief, smuggled itself in, like an effect
of one of Plato’s wandering causes.”15  This is a relation that is prior to
every representation or phenomenality. This means that the Other, as Roger
Burggraeve points out, is not secured in the horizon of the surrounding
world or any other system or totality. The Other exceeds every historical,
sociological, psychological, and cultural framework of meaning and rep-
resentation.16
The Other is secured in the “absolute other,” the “being of beings”
or the “wholly other,” the concept of which Levinas calls Illeity, meaning
the transcendence of the Infinite beyond all thematization or entering into
conjunction with me while still concerning me. Yet, the Infinite other leaves
its trace in the Other whose face is the epiphany of the Infinite other that
obliges me into responsiveness to and responsible relationship with the
Other as the signification of the other. Levinas identifies the operation of
illeity God.17  Let me note precisely that because ethics or responsibility
or otherwise than being (autrement) is fundamental, for Levinas, it is not
cognition prior to approach, but vice versa.
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The point deserves stressing that it is because the Other, whose
face bears the irreversible presence of the other, appears against the total-
ization of the self, that the Other puts me in the accusative. The “I” - the
accusative “me” - encounters my neighbor, the Other (Autrui), as one
who has priority over me, thus, placing me as a sub-jectum and speaks to
me of the wholly other (autre).18  So being, the I remains forever open to
the impress of the Other/other, because it is always in the accusative -
sub-jectum, passive and dedicated to alterity.  As he writes:
The epiphany of the absolute other is a face, in which the other calls on me
and signifies an order to me through his nudity, his denuding. His pres-
ence is a summons to answer. The I does not only become aware of this
necessity to answer, as though it were an obligation or a duty about which
it would have to come to a decision; it is in its very position wholly a
responsibility or a diacony, as it is put in Isaiah, chapter 53.
To be an I means then not to be able to escape responsibility, as
though the whole edifice of creation rested on my shoulders. But the
responsibility that empties the I of its imperialism and its egoism, even the
egoism of salvation, does not transform it into a moment of the universal
order; it conforms the uniqueness of the I. The uniqueness of the I is the
fact that no one can answer for me.19
This ever openness witnesses to the passing of the Infinite Thou,
which finds expression in communication - the said, so inevitable because
its signifyingness provokes signification by provoking the responsibility of
the-one-to-the-other, which is the structure of ethics.20  Significantly, it is
in this ethical relationship that a person becomes a person or is liberated -
“an anarchic liberation.”21
With the concept of the “thirdness” or the illeity, Levinas tran-
scends the ontology of Buber’s I-thou relationship, providing his concept
of Gemeinschaft with a transcendental condition. The ethical implication
of responsibility to the other which did not arise from a free contemplative
subject, but which reduces the subject to passivity of an accusative ad
infinitum, is that the self is the one who has not right. In this context, the
self is not a conqueror, swept up in the self-consciousness of continuous
rivalry with enemies and the need for powerful self-assertion of its exist-
ence, which is the image of the person that has de facto prevailed in the
modern Western world and breeds war. From this purview, war, for
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Levinas, has an ontological metaphysical root - the totalization of being.
Consequently, the idea of peace for him can be affirmed and pursued only
beyond this ontology or totalization, possible only from an eschatological
point of departure.
Levinas’s idea of eschaton or eschatology is the seeking of a rela-
tionship of beings beyond the objective totality of existents and not the
end of history, as it exists in Christian theology. Eschatology, in his view,
“draws beings out of the jurisdiction of history and the future; it arouses
them in and calls them forth to their full responsibility.”22  Levinas’s
eschatological responsibility is characterized by hospitality to the Other,
which entails the recognition of the dignity and unconditional rights of the
Other as one to whom I am subject and through whom I realize my free-
dom. Invariably, in Levinas’s thought, justice, which is crucial for peace,
begins not in my self-asserted ego or freedom, but in the Other. However,
the superiority of the Other, or rather, the asymmetric structure of the
relationship, is one that is ethical. The Other teaches me from an ethical
height.23  The content of taking responsibility for the Other in self-disinter-
estedness is goodness, which lies outside the Other. In Levinas’s con-
struct, it is what the Other teaches of me that is original, awakening in me
in the epiphany of his or her face a guilty conscience and responsiveness
towards his or her wellbeing in complete disinterestedness - a responsibil-
ity in which the idea of infinity is consummated.
Because of the uniqueness of the self in the passivity or the pas-
sion of the self, subjectivity for Levinas correlates with suffering or perse-
cution. The proximity of the face of the Other affects or wounds the self,
leaving the self vulnerable, guilty, a debtor, even when the self has not
made a choice. As Adriaan Peperzak puts it, “Only a persecuted subject
is a subject who - without so desiring, against his will - lives for the Other.”24
Levinas well illustrates his idea of persecution with the idea of substitution
by which he means that the subject is subject to every thing, responsible
for all that has to do with the other.25  The option open to the subject in this
unconditional hostage is not death, but to live beyond egoism and altru-
ism. This means the religiosity of the self. It is in this religiosity, that is, the
condition of being hostage, according to Levinas, that pity, compassion,
forgiveness and proximity exist, which is the condition of all solidarity.26
Let me recall the point that for Levinas the Other is not only my
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immediate neighbor. The third party whom I also stand in relationship with
extends to the Other Other whom I do not even know. The third party
introduces into my relationship the question of justice as necessary and
togetherness in a place as the meaning of essence.27  Invariably, Levinas’s
ethical rule of responsibility to the Other, as John Milbank says, calls us
“to place first the general community, which is bound together by such
respect to the generalized otherness ... For no other ever demands my
self-loss, my giving myself up - no neighbor, but only a threat to the neigh-
bor which is at the same time a threat to a community principle of mutual
self-sacrifice to maintain solidarity in order to preserve the fiction of com-
munity into the future.”28  In the community context, equity becomes nec-
essary. The third party balances the asymmetry of proximity, thus making
the I stand in symmetric relation with the Other.29
On the same reason of the third party who makes human relation-
ship fundamentally communitarian, non-resistance, for Levinas, cannot be
generalized. For him, as Burggraeve explains, the individual can decide
not to respond violently to his or her persecutor, thus, breaking the circle
of violence, but cannot make the decision for the other. I cannot leave
others defenseless before an unjust aggressor. While Levinas is of the
view that no effort should be spared in nonviolently settling conflict, he
maintains that we cannot hold, a priori, that there is no situation in which
the use of violence is legitimate. For him, the violence to the third party
justifies my opposing the Other’s violence even with violence.30
I will turn at this juncture to the logic of Christian pacifism.
The Ethical and Anthological Logic of Christian Pacifism
Arguably, the greatest challenge of Christian pacifism since the
Constantinian fusion of church and state in the fourth-century has been to
overcome the overpowering influence of the (Augustinian) negative as-
sumptions about human beings upon which the construct of just-war ethic
for social morality has been based. The Christian pacifist anthropological
framework calls for a reformulation of the anthropological question for the
construct of both personal and social morality. The first aspect of this
anthropological reformulation is the change from seeing the fundamental
tendency of the human person as negative (evil), with a pervasive pathol-
ogy of pride and urge to dominate, to moral, as a relational being whoKenneth Obiekwe  103
reveals oneself to the other because of love and towards whom the only
appropriate attitude is love. In other words, in the Christian pacifist an-
thropological framework, to overcome the dominance of the negative an-
thropological assumptions upon which power morality has been constructed
and dominated Christian position and teaching for centuries is to take a
new approach to ethics based on the positive viewpoint of the possibility
of human self-transcending acts and responsible relationships.31
From the pacifist anthropological base and framework, which, as
Levinas’s personalist philosophy supports, sees the human person and
fundamental tendency as relational and responsible loving relationship with
the other, the ethical orientation in the construct of social morality cannot
be how or when to provide a metaphysical distinction and moral privilege
to a violence we intend using to counter the violence we loath as morally
outrageous. It is rather how to awaken and draw human beings into moral
sensibility, imagination, and creativity in continuous self-transcending act
against the passions that tend to belie our authentic personality and de-
stroy our relation with the other. The orientation is toward an ethic of
nonviolence, the epitaph of which can be said to be that there is someway
to appeal to and instill moral sensitivity to human beings, to give them the
assurance to love, the security to be kind, and the integrity necessary for a
functional empathy and responsible relationship. This will give us a more
enduring just and peaceful society.32
The Christian pacifist anthropological framework correlates with
community - the second aspect in the reformulation of the anthropological
question. Although the Christian pacifist ethic transcends the dichotomy
between individualism and communalism, it sees community as funda-
mental to the realization of the human person. However, the Christian
pacifist anthropology does not entertain the subordination of the individual
to community to entail denying or undermining the individual's rights, free-
dom, and dignity. On the contrary, it seeks authentic community seen in
nurturing human freedom and the fuller realization of the human person,
safeguarding human rights and dignity against arbitrary exercise of power.
This understanding of community prioritizes the place of the poor. As
Levinas’s philosophical anthropological ethical construct informs us, it is
in such community that transcends the traditional opposition between in-
dividualism and communalism that the individual enters into symmetric
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relationship with the other and gains his or her wholeness. However, it is
with the question of which means the community can use in safeguarding
the individual’s rights and dignity and the common good against arbitrary
exercise of power that the question of what the community is vis-à-vis the
individuals that constitute it critically arises.
Levinas posits ethics that transcend both the individual and com-
munity in the disclosure of personality. As he writes:
Justice is born from the signfyingness of signification, the one-for-the-
other, signification. This means concretely or empirically that justice is not
a legality regulating human masses, from which a technique of social
equilibrium is drawn, harmonizing antagonistic forces. That would be a
justification of State delivered over to its own necessities. Justice is im-
possible without the one rendering it finding himself in proximity…. Jus-
tice, society, the State and its institutions, exchanges and work are com-
prehensible out of proximity. This means that nothing is outside of the
control of the one for the other.33
Drawing from this, whether the community is a collection of indi-
viduals or more than the sum total of the individuals, as different opinions
may hold, it is a moral agent subject to the same ethical authority as the
individuals that constitute it. Even though one may argue that there is a
common community interest that is beyond individual interest, community
is not an abstract entity and does not exist apart from the individuals that
compose it. Here, too, is the position of Christian pacifism, which, as I will
show below, derives from a higher moral authority to either of individual
or community. What this means is that violence cannot be bad in the hands
of individuals and good in the hands of community, which is subject to the
same ethics with the individuals that constitute it and exists for the fuller
realization of their personality. However, given human limitation or the
effect of sin, there remains the serious problem that there will always be
some people who would tend to dominate and threaten the lives of others.
Indeed, it is in the community context that control becomes very pertinent,
which may require the use of force. But this does not mean that there has
to be a new ethics for community the main thrust of which is violence or
that the community has a blanket authority in use of violence. What the
pacifist anthropological ethical framework enjoins the community is to
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spare no effort in engaging in loving, construction of nonviolent ways of
controlling human irrational and selfish impulses and settling of disputes,
while at the endpoint it can engage the ethics of justice within the limits of
relative prudence and self-defense.34
The above argument is more compelling from the point of view of
revelation on which the logic of Christian pacifism lies. Christian tradition
believes that the human person is a creature that bears an inherent, irre-
ducible relation to his or her creator. While the Christian tradition shares
with a number of other religions a belief in the goodness and unity of the
created universe, it distinguishes itself by confessing that God, in Jesus,
became genuinely human.35  Jesus Christ is the person par excellence who
reveals to us a new anthropos, and redeemed and restored humanity to a
state of unsurpassable worth. For Christians, no epistemological commit-
ment precedes their faith in God. Ethics is an inexorable and inextricable
part of this faith, and it is Jesus who “defines” it.
A proper theological approach drawing from revelation will ask what
the human person or dignity means first and foremost as revealed by God
through Jesus Christ and in relation to God. What Jesus' humanity reveals to
us is that the human person is a person of unsurpassable worth and dignity. Let
us note that the person of Christian biblical revelation is a person in community
with others and with Christ at the center. Levinas talks of the Third who is
always involved in my relationship with the Other, who plays a fundamental
role in the values and philosophies of the self in that relationship, such that the
relationship is not I-thou, but I-you and the Third - a threesome relationship. It
is in this ethical relationship that God is thought of. In our Christian context, as
Graham Ward rhetorically posits, “Cannot that you in Levinas’s Jewish triad
be read Christologically? As Christians we too are ‘always threesome: I and
you and the Third who is in our midst.’”36  Matthew 25 is one of the powerful
biblical passages that evidence this Trinitarian pattern of relationship. In this
passage Christ tells us that whatever we do to anyone we do it to him. What
he taught and showed us about how to deal with every human being is glaring:
love and nonviolence, which he demonstrates by his own character of un-
bounded love unto death. As John Howard Yoder says, this is the only valid
starting point for Christian pacifism.37  Christian pacifism is based on faith in
Jesus Christ as Lord.
Like Levinas, Christian pacifism is concerned with the realization
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of the human person in a community of love, justice and peace, but unlike
Levinas, the Absolute other determining the principle of responsible rela-
tionship is not knowable only through ethical command, but a real person
of flesh and blood, Jesus Christ, yet, truly God. The implication of the
New Testament anthropology and ethics is that the human person is con-
stituted in community or rather called into relationship with the other, not
with the background of the self, but of Christ. This means, as Yoder
stresses, that neither the neighbor nor the intrinsic sacredness of life ac-
count for the reason we love our neighbor, including our enemy, and repu-
diate violence. The reason is not that we think our enemies are wonderful
people or that we are unconcerned with the life of our innocent neighbor/
s. The simple reason is that it is what Christ did and asks us to do.38  As is
the view of Levinas, for Christian pacifism, it is praxis (obedience to Christ)
first before reflection.
Following the example of Christ, pacifism is not a stance of pas-
sive spectatorship in the face of evil. It is a way of life in active pursuit of
justice and peace. Here lies the logic of nonviolent conflict reconciliation
and peacebuilding as a product of faith - the way, following the example
of Christ, the New Testament shows us .to keep from turning our moral
outrages into newfangled versions of the thing that outraged us.39
What elements in the process of nonviolent process of conflict
reconciliation and peacebuilding do the logic of Christian pacifism and
Levinas’s ethic of responsibility suggest for responsibly and adequately
dealing with contemporary conflicts?
Elements of Nonviolent Peacemaking/Peacebuilding for Respon-
sibly and Adequately Dealing with Today’s Violent Conflicts
There are four key elements, we can take from the logic of Chris-
tian pacifism and Levinas’s ethics of responsibility, and apply for respon-
sible process of peacemaking/peacebuilding
1. A Responsible Peacemaking/Peacebuilding Process Should Be a
Sustainable Community Process and Community-oriented as well
as in Pursuit of Holistic Change.
Seen either from a philosophical, theological, or experiential point
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siveness to boundness and boundedness. Both commonality and plurality
are essential parts of our human nature and need to be recognized for a
peaceful community. However, in an age that encourages selfishness, ma-
terialism, relativism, and discrimination, indeed, in which personal rela-
tions are forced into Buber’s “I-it,” it is important to stress our common
humanity, that a person is a person only in relation with other people. Our
interrelatedness and interdependence requires, in the first place, that a
responsible process of peacemaking/peacebuiding should be community-
oriented. Thus, it should work toward a proactive encounter between the
conflicting parties to thrash out their conflict issues as problems to be
solved and not problems to be won.
Also, given that today’s conflicts are entangled in a complex web
of relationships and that human relationship and wellbeing have personal,
interpersonal, structural and cultural dimensions and elements, a respon-
sible and adequate peacemaking/peacebuilding process must seek holis-
tic change. To be precise, this means, first, that the process must seek to
change both the immediate presenting issues of the conflict as well as the
underlying issues, the deeper level of relationships in which the conflicts
are entangled. Second, it means that the process must pursue constructive
changing cutting across all dimensions of human relation and systems and
structures, which contribute to human wellbeing. This correlates with the
idea that peace is not simply the absence of war, but involves human
wholeness and integrity. Thus, the quest for peace entails creating those
conditions and structures necessary for human wellbeing or the fuller real-
ization of the human person and dignity. Because of this holistic change
orientation, peacemaking/peacebuilding activities must be carried out at
the different levels of society at the same time. Invariably, it must be a
community process, involving multiple actors. Evidently, a responsible and
adequate peacemaking/peacebuilding process must move beyond a num-
ber of frontiers that characterized the traditional paradigms of peacemak-
ing/peacebuilding. As John Paul Lederach eloquently puts it:
We must move beyond a short-term, crisis orientation and toward devel-
opment of our capacity to think about social change designs in terms of
decades. We must move beyond a hierarchical focus on politics and to-
ward the construction of an organic, broad-based approach that creates
space for genuine responsibility, ownership, and participation in
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peacebuilding. We must move beyond a narrow view of postconflict
peacebuilding as a political transition and toward the formation of a web
that envisions a whole body politic, whole persons seeking change in a
radically changing environment.
2. A Responsible Peacemaking/Peacebuilding Process Should Be a
Process of Restorative Justice and Relationship.
The Christian pacifist perspective of peacemaking/peacebuilding
sees peace as rightly the work of justice, for love, which is at the heart of
human dignity and relationship, cannot be separated from justice. Love
and justice exist in dynamic and paradoxical relationship.41  Love engen-
ders justice. But the justice love engenders, and which respects human
dignity and is concerned with community building, is not the retributive
kind of justice the aim of which is to punish. It is restorative justice the aim
of which is to correct and heal broken relationships. Restorative justice
and relationship defines a paradigm of peacemaking that neither neglects
the dignity and wellbeing of the victim of injustice nor violates the dignity
of the perpetrator, but works towards change and reconciliation and fu-
ture mutual relationship.
Let me state it categorically that the central thesis of the peace-
making in the paradigm of restorative justice and relationship is not that
justice is an absolute prerequisite for reconciliation, but that “true peace is
possible only through forgiveness and reconciliation.”42  However, the
centrality of forgiveness does not mean that there is no genuine debt of
justice. Forgiveness and repentance go together. This is necessary, as the
paradigm of restorative justice and relationship is also concerned with the
moral integrity of the offender. On its own, forgiveness is not easy in a
context of violent conflict. It requires the healing and purification of memory.
At the heart of the process of restorative justice and relationship is the
creation of a social space of proactive encounter between the conflicting
parties, where the past is probed in an atmosphere of acknowledgment of
truth or the wrong committed, validation of the pain caused, acceptance
of repentance, offer of forgiveness, and then restoration of the broken
relationship.43  Levinas is insightful to this process.  As Burggraeve suc-
cinctly puts his view:
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According to Levinas, the conditions necessary for a genuine, legitimate
and complete pardon can be realized only in intimate community where
both partners are fully open to one another and thus in complete control
of their actions. When in an intimate relation with the other I commit an
injustice against him, this pardon is available to me only in the form of
judgment of my actions made on the basis of a careful analysis of my
intentions or examination of my conscience. Only after I thus confess my
fault can the other person grant me forgiveness and forget what I have
done. In this way, the relation with the other can free me from pain at
actions escaping my will and intentions.44
From this purview, justice and truth can rightly be described as
requisites for reconciliation. This critical task in peacemaking/peacebuilding
process can be seen here as creating such environment and space of en-
counter, which enables both parties to transcend their selfish orbits, anxi-
eties, and conflict issues and enter into a new reassuring and trustful rela-
tionship.
3. A Responsible Peacemaking/Peacebuilding Process Should Be an
Eschatological Peace Process.
A Christian pacifist perspective of conflict reconciliation and
peacebuilding takes the issue of justice seriously. However, it recognizes
that we cannot achieve full justice in this world. It suggests that a respon-
sible peace process must be carried out within an eschatological setting.
This means acknowledging God’s creative and redemptive presence in
human history. The historical event of Christ, as George Weigel observes,
reveals the ultimate creative intention of both human beings and the history
we now live in. As far as the historical incarnation is concerned, we live in
an anticipatory way. Thus, the Christian proclamation about human nature
and destiny flows directly into eschatology.45
Although Levinas’s notion of eschatology is not about the end of
history understood chronologically as is the Christian notion, it shares with
Christianity the notion that eschatology determines the nature of ethics.
Eschatology, from his transcendent ethics and in the measure in which it
calls us into full responsibility in relation beyond the totality or beyond
history, posits a limit to our behavior. Set in the context of ‘incarnational
humanism,’ eschatology is not a call for inaction. It calls us to responsibil-
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ity and action for the cause of justice and peace. It is one that affirms
human possibility under divine grace. From this perspective, shalom serves
as a kind of check-and-balance in a peace process. It defines the orient-
ing horizon the pacifist perspective of peacemaking/peacebuilding, but
cautions us against thinking that we must achieve complete justice on earth
for peace to flourish.46  The eschatological setting of peace tells us that
complete justice is an eschatological reality.
4. A Responsible Peacemaking/Peacebuilding Process Should
Embrace Certain Spirituality.
As Christian pacifist’s and Levinas’s anthropology tells us, human
dignity and relatedness, or, to use Levinas’s language, the face of the Other
makes a demand on us, which responding to it calls us to certain spiritual-
ity. The face of the Other invites us into solidarity, which, in turn, demands
of us to engage in peacemaking/peacebuilding work, and responsibly too.
Levinas talks of sacrifice, pity, compassion, pardon and proximity as the
condition of all solidarity. These define the spirituality peace actors needs,
coupled with humility and patience, for responsible peacemaking/
peacebuilding. A responsible peacemaking/peacebuilding requires a non-
instrumental and non-dispassionate approach.
Conclusion
Levinas’s ethics of responsibility is in accord with the central an-
thropological and ethical concerns of Christian pacifism. His work is evi-
dence that a sound ethics needs a sound anthropology. With his ethical
subjectivity, which dethrones the self as the guarantor of morality and
freedom as the highest of primary values in establishing the primacy of
heteronomy of our response to the human other, or to God as the abso-
lutely other, he reminds Christians that obedience to our Christological
nonviolent ethics lies at the heart of our genuine humanity and Christian
vocation. Generally, both views encourage us to take a new approach,
personally and socially, to the pursuit of justice and peace, and to see
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peacemaking as a demand of our common humanity.
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